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Available online xxxxIn this study, cross-cultural differences in cognitive test scores are hypothesized to depend on a
test's cultural complexity (Cultural Complexity Hypothesis: CCH), here conceptualized as its
content familiarity, rather than on its cognitive complexity (Spearman's Hypothesis: SH). The
content familiarity of tests assessing short-term memory, attention, working memory, and
figural and verbal fluid reasoning, was manipulated by constructing test versions with an item
content derived from either Afrikaans or Tswana culture in South Africa. Both test versions
were administered to children of both cultures. The sample consisted of 161 urban Afrikaans,
181 urban, and 159 rural Tswana children (Mage=9.37 years). Children generally performed
best on the test version that was designed for their own group, particularly on the cognitively
and culturally complex working memory and figural fluid reasoning tests. This relation
between content familiarity and cognitive test performance supports CCH and disconfirms SH.






South AfricaCross-cultural differences in cognitive test scores are not
well understood (Fagan & Holland, 2002, 2007, 2009; Helms-
Lorenz, Van de Vijver, & Poortinga, 2003; Sternberg et al.,
2002). Where do they come from and why are they larger for
some tests than for others? Spearman's Hypothesis (SH)
relates these cross-cultural differences to the cognitive
complexity of tests; differences are larger for tests with a
higher cognitive complexity (Jensen, 1985, 1998). SH attri-
butes this pattern to cross-cultural differences in the under-
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al., Rugby versus Socce
s, Intelligence (2010), dcognitive complexity more strongly rely. However, score
differences between cultures can also be caused by test bias or
by cultural differences in valued and therefore trained
strategies to solve certain cognitive tasks (Bridgeman &
Buttram, 1975; Montie & Fagan, 1988). In line with the option
of test bias, Helms-Lorenz et al. (2003) state that a test's
cognitive complexity could be confounded with its cultural
complexity (which can cause test bias) and the latter may
largely explain cross-cultural score differences. A test's
cultural complexity refers to the extent to which specific
cultural knowledge is required to perform well on this test,
such as declarative (factual) knowledge and procedural
knowledge (i.e., knowledge on cultural practices, such as
sports or celebrations) that is shared in a particular culture.
The extent to which test content (e.g., concepts, drawings) is
more familiar to one of several compared cultural groups is a
reflection of cultural complexity. In order to disentangle the
influence of cultural and cognitive complexity on test
performance, the present study examines the effect of content
familiarity on the performance on tests of different cognitive
complexity. More specifically, we address the role of content
familiarity in tests measuring (the cognitively complex abilityr in South Africa: Content familiarity contributes to cross-
oi:10.1016/j.intell.2010.07.004
2 M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxof) fluid reasoning and tests measuring (the less complex,
though related abilities of) short-termmemory, attention, and
working memory (Carroll, 1993; McGrew, 2005). For each of
these tests, two test versions were developed in which the
content familiarity of the items was maximized for either
Afrikaans or Tswana school-age children in South Africa. Both
versions were administered to children of both groups.
1. Cultural complexity
Successful performance on a test with a high cultural
complexity requires specific cultural knowledge (Helms-Lorenz
et al., 2003). This knowledge is stored in a semantic network in
memory, which can be viewed as a system of nodes (cultural
elements)with links (associations)between them. Thisnetwork
is comparable to the system of cognitive elements required for
cognitive skill acquisition (see Anderson, 1982). For peoplewho
are familiar with the culture in which a test is developed, this
semantic network has a well defined structure of strong and
weak links, which means that relevant associations are readily
made between the content of the test and their knowledge. This
network facilitates the successful completion of the test. People
from a different culture do not have this well developed
semantic network associated with the content of this particular
test, because they may not know the cultural elements or their
associations; as a consequence, they have difficulty to perform
well. The level of cultural complexity of a test then refers to the
extent to which an elaborate and automated semantic network
of cultural information is required to perform well. Cultural
complexity is conceptualized in the present study as the extent
to which test content is more familiar to one of the compared
groups.
2. Cognitive abilities in the present study
Short-term memory is described as “the ability to appre-
hendandmaintain awareness of elements of information in the
immediate situation” (McGrew, 2005, p. 153). Controlled
attention is defined as “the capacity to maintain and hold
relevant information in the face of interference or distraction”
(Swanson, 2008, p. 582). Working memory is “a system for the
simultaneous processing and storage of information” (Ober-
erauer, Süß, Schulze,Wilhelm, &Wittmann, 2000, p. 1018). The
assignment of attention to the contents of short-termmemory
creates working memory (Schweizer & Moosbrugger, 2004;
Swanson, 2008). Fluid reasoning is defined as “the use of
deliberate and controlledmental operations to solve novel, ‘on-
the-spot’ problems (i.e., tasks that cannot be performed
automatically)” (McGrew, 2005, p. 151).
Some researchers state that short-term memory and
workingmemory cannot be differentiated in children (Hutton
& Towse, 2001); however, others have shown that they are
already distinguishable from six years of age (Gathercole,
Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004; Swanson, 2008).
Working memory capacity and fluid reasoning are strongly
related (Süß, Oberauer,Wittmann,Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002),
though distinguishable (Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005).
Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, and Minkoff (2002)
indicated that rather complex tasks such as working memory
tasks do not rely on automated routines, similar to fluid
reasoning tasks.Workingmemory and reasoning tasks share aPlease cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus Socce
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (2010), ddemand for controlled attention. Both working memory and
attention play a role in fluid reasoning (Unsworth & Engle,
2005); they have a direct relationship with fluid reasoning
and the relation between attention and fluid reasoning is
mediated by working memory as well (Schweizer & Moos-
brugger, 2004). The cognitive structure underlying fluid
reasoning abilities that is compatible with these findings is
shown in Fig. 1. Short-term memory and attention have both
direct and indirect relations with fluid reasoning. Working
memory plays a mediating role. Going from left to right in
Fig. 1, the abilities become cognitively more complex.3. Cognitive versus cultural complexity
Relatively small cross-cultural differences have been
found in attention and short-termmemory, larger differences
in working memory, and the largest differences have been
reported in fluid reasoning. How can this patterning be
explained? One explanation, known as Spearman's Hypoth-
esis (SH), holds that tasks with a higher cognitive complexity
show larger cross-cultural score differences, mainly because
of assumed cross-cultural differences in the underlying
general cognitive ability on which such tasks strongly rely
(Jensen, 1985, 1998). Fluid reasoning tasks produce the
largest cross-cultural differences because of their large
cognitive complexity when compared to attention, short-
term memory, and working memory tasks (Carroll, 1993).
Jensen has conducted many studies that supported SH,
ranging from batteries of reaction time tasks in which
cognitive complexity was varied by increasing the number
of response alternatives (Jensen, 1993) to broad cognitive
batteries involving a range of cognitive abilities (reviews can
be found in Jensen, 1985, 1998). Both Spearman and Jensen
focused on IQ differences between Blacks and Whites in the
United States; other researchers, testing SH among other
groups in other contexts, using various cognitive tests, also
found support for the hypothesis (e.g., Hartmann, Kruuse, &
Nyborg, 2007; Lynn & Owen, 1994; Rushton, 2002; Te
Nijenhuis, Evers, & Mur, 2000; Te Nijenhuis, Tolboom, Resing,
& Bleichrodt, 2004; Te Nijenhuis & Van der Flier, 1997, 2003,
2004, 2005).
SH has met with both statistical and conceptual criticism.
The adequacy of widely employed statistical procedures to
test the hypothesis has been questioned. Multigroup confir-
matory factor analysis has been proposed as a statistically
more rigorous procedure for testing SH than Jensen's method
of correlated vectors; a re-analysis of two data sets that were
supportive of SH when analyzed by Jensen's method failed to
meet basic requirements of cross-cultural comparability in a
multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (see Dolan, Roorda, &
Wicherts, 2004). Also, Wicherts and Dolan (2010) found that
the allegedly small cultural bias reported by Te Nijenhuis et al.
(2004) appeared to be more substantial when re-analyzing
their data by including a test for the equality of measurement
intercepts over groups. In a similar vein,Wicherts and Johnson
(2009) provided statistical arguments against the procedures
used by Rushton (2002; see also Rushton, Bons, Vernon, &
Cvorovic, 2007) to draw conclusions about the nature of group
differences in cognitive abilities in terms of SH and the






















Fig. 1. Cognitive structure (hypothesized and confirmed). Note: all depicted parameter estimates are significant, pb .01.
Table 1
Expected score pattern for hypotheses.
Hypothesis Test version Expected score pattern
Group
1 (CCH) Afrikaans-culture Afrikaans≥Rural Tswana
Tswana-culture Rural Tswana≥Afrikaans
2 (SH) Afrikaans-culture One group≥other groups
Tswana-culture The same group≥other groups
3 Afrikaans-culture Urban Tswana in between other
groups
Tswana-culture Urban Tswana in between other
groups
3M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxThere are substantive reasons to doubt the importance of
cognitive complexity in explaining cross-cultural score
differences. Hunt and Carlson (2007) as well as Wicherts,
Dolan, Carlson, and Van der Maas (2010) mentioned
environmental aspects as possible sources of group differ-
ences in cognitive test scores. The related concepts of
affluence and socioeconomic status are suggested to contrib-
ute to these score differences (Van de Vijver, 1997). Also, the
content of a test or the medium in which a test is
administered has been shown to determine how well a
child performs. Serpell (1979) tested the perceptual skills of
British and Zambian children by administering similar tasks
in different media. British children performed better on paper
and pencil tasks whereas the Zambian children performed
better on wire-modelling tasks. Carraher, Carraher, and
Schliemann (1985) found that Brazilian school-going chil-
dren performed better on arithmetic tasks when they were
presented in the form of a problem (as in an everyday market
situation) than when they were presented as numerical
calculations (as in school). Fagan and Holland (2002, 2007,
2009) have shown thatmajority andminority adults in the US
obtained similar scores on cognitive tasks when they were
equally exposed to the information required to successfully
complete the tasks.
The explanation of cross-cultural score differences that we
test in the current study holds that cognitive complexity is
usually confounded with cultural complexity, and that the
latter is the actual factor explaining most of the cross-cultural
score differences (Helms-Lorenz et al., 2003). We label this
explanation the Cultural Complexity Hypothesis (CCH). The
model holds that cross-cultural score differences increase
with the cultural complexity of the stimulus content (i.e.,
content familiarity). Cultural complexity can vary both across
tests that measure different skills and across tests that
measure a single skill using stimuli that differ in familiarity.
To startwith the former, tests that address simple information
processing usually show less cultural complexity than tests
addressing complex information processing (Helms-Lorenz etPlease cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus Socce
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (2010), dal., 2003; Vock & Holling, 2008; cf. however Jensen, 1993, and
Te Nijenhuis & Van der Flier, 2003). The former tests,
measuring abilities such as attention and short-termmemory,
do not employ complex cultural information and hence, they
are not very sensitive to group (and individual) differences in
access to cultural information. Cross-cultural differences on
these tests are expected to be small. The differences are larger
on more complex processes, such as working memory, and
will be largest on the most complex tests, such as fluid
reasoning tests, which often require extensive cultural
information to solve them. SH would predict the same
increase in cross-cultural differences across these different
types of tests, but due to an increase in cognitive rather than
cultural complexity; hence, the common confounding of these
two types of complexity. Therefore, the present study
examines cross-cultural differences also across tests that
measure the same skill using stimuli of different familiarity,
as explained in the next section.4. Present study and hypotheses
A test was constructed for each of the abilities displayed in
Fig. 1. There were two versions of each test. One version
contained items with a relatively higher content familiarityr in South Africa: Content familiarity contributes to cross-
oi:10.1016/j.intell.2010.07.004
Table 2
Sample size for each group and test version.
Group Test version
Afrikaans-culture Tswana-culture
Total Female Male Grade 3 Grade 4 Total Female Male Grade 3 Grade 4
Afrikaans 80 39 41 40 40 81 41 40 41 40
Urban Tswana 91 38 53 44 47 90 46 44 44 46
Rural Tswana 82 39 43 42 40 77 42 35 41 36
4 M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxfor the Afrikaans than for the Tswana children, labeled the
Afrikaans-culture test version. The other contained items
with a relatively higher content familiarity for the Tswana
than for the Afrikaans children, labeled the Tswana-culture
test version. The study involved both urban and rural Tswana
children, who differed in their exposure to Afrikaans culture
(with urban children being more exposed than rural
children) and to more traditional Tswana culture (with
rural children being more exposed than urban children).
According to CCH, differences in test scores between the
Afrikaans and Tswana children are due to differences in the
content familiarity of the tests; CCH predicts that one group
scores at least as high as the other group(s) on the test
version developed for its own culture.1 According to SH,
differences between the Afrikaans and Tswana children are
due to differences in the underlying cognitive abilities that
are required to successfully complete the tests; SH predicts
that one group scores consistently higher than the other(s)
on both test versions (apart from random fluctuations).
Generally, we expect the score differences to be largest
between the Afrikaans and the rural Tswana group. Based on
these two different lines of reasoning, two contradicting
hypotheses can be formulated of which we expect to confirm
the first (CCH) and disconfirm the second (SH; see also
Table 1 for an overview of the expected score patterns):
1. CCH: Afrikaans children score at least as high as rural
Tswana children on the Afrikaans-culture test version and
rural Tswana children score at least as high as Afrikaans
children on the Tswana-culture test version (differences
between groups are smallest for short-term memory and
attention, larger for working memory, and largest for fluid
reasoning).
2. SH: One particular cultural group scores at least as high as
the other group(s) on both the Afrikaans-culture and the
Tswana-culture test version (differences between groups
are smallest for short-term memory and attention, larger
for working memory, and largest for fluid reasoning).
The urban Tswana children are exposed to aspects of both
cultures and are therefore expected to score in between the1 The three groups included in the present study are characterized by
large differences in SES and related environmental conditions, with the
Afrikaans group living in the most advantaged environment. As a
consequence, it is very likely that the Afrikaans group obtains higher overall
scores than the other groups. Our hypotheses do not mention these
conditions and resultant score differences, because we statistically correct
for a presumably large part of these differences in our hypotheses tests by
standardizing for SES.
Please cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus Socce
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (2010), dAfrikaans and rural Tswana group on both test versions. This
score pattern would be in line with both CCH and SH:
3. Urban Tswana children score in between Afrikaans and
rural Tswana children on both the Afrikaans-culture and
the Tswana-culture test version.
5. Method
5.1. Participants
The sample consisted of 501 South African primary school
children (245 girls, 256 boys) from grades 3 and 4, with an
average age of 9.37 years (SD=1.05). One hundred sixty-one
were white urban Afrikaans children from two primary schools
in the town of Potchefstroom, North-West Province; 181 were
black urban Tswana children from two primary schools in
Ikageng, a township near Potchefstroom; 159 were black rural
Tswana children from three primary schools in Ramatlabama, a
rural setting 15 kilometres outside of the city of Mafikeng,
North-West Province. The three groups differed in culture
(Afrikaans-culture versus Tswana-culture), language (Afrikaans
language versus Setswana language, the language of the
Tswana), socioeconomic status (the Afrikaans group was of
higher socioeconomic status than the two Tswana groups) and
locality of residence (urban versus rural). The latter distinction,
however, was not as large as the terms urban and ruralmight
suggest; it was merely a relative distinction in that the
children from Potchefstroom (“Afrikaans”) and Ikageng
(“urban Tswana”) lived in amore urban areawhen compared
to the more rural area of Ramatlabama (“rural Tswana”).
However, we did not observe substantial differences in the
quality of education unlike in many studies describing urban–
rural distinctions. The main implication of our relative urban–
rural distinction was a difference in the exposure to Afrikaans'
culture; the urban Tswana group was more exposed to the
Afrikaans way of life than the rural Tswana group.
Most of the houses of Afrikaans children were made of
bricks and had tiled roofs, while most houses of the Tswana
children had walls of either corrugated iron or bricks and roofs
of corrugated iron. Eighty-one percent of Afrikaans children
had their own roomasopposed to31% of the urbanTswana and
40% of the rural Tswana children. Afrikaans children had 2.36
cars per family on average, whereas 35% of the urban Tswana
families and 50% of the rural Tswana families had a car.
5.2. Instruments
Five cognitive testswere constructed: a short-termmemory
test, an attention test, a working memory test, a figural fluidr in South Africa: Content familiarity contributes to cross-
oi:10.1016/j.intell.2010.07.004
Table 3
Means and standard deviations for scores on Raven's Standard Progressive
Matrices.





M SD M SD
Afrikaans 23.75 5.07 23.75 4.83
Urban Tswana 14.75 5.31 13.00 4.78
Rural Tswana 12.71 4.94 12.90 4.99
5M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxreasoning test, and a verbalfluid reasoning test. Therewere two
cultural versions of each test, based on the relative familiarity of
item content: an Afrikaans-culture and a Tswana-culture
version. The two test versions were developed in a three-
month pilot phase. We visited children's homes and schools,
and spoke to parents, teachers, and specialists (e.g., a child
psychologist, speech therapist) to obtain information regarding
words, objects, customs and practices that were familiar to the
Afrikaans and Tswana children, respectively. Pilot testing took
place at three schools and involved 50 children. An iterative
procedure was applied of translating the test instructions into
the local languages, administering the instruments to a small
number of children, and adapting the content and/or instruc-
tions if necessary, until the instruments were deemed
appropriate. The instructions and items of both test versions
were developed in English and then translated into the
Afrikaans and the Setswana language. Afrikaans children did
all tests (so, both the tests with a more Afrikaans and the tests
with a more Tswana content) in the Afrikaans language;
Tswana children did both types of tests in the Setswana
language. The short-term memory test, attention test, and
working memory test had a discontinuation rule: these tests
were stopped after the child failed three consecutive items. The
figural and verbal fluid reasoning tests did not have a
discontinuation rule.
5.2.1. Short-term memory test
This individually administered test consisted of 24 items
and required the child to repeat word sequences, varying
from two to nine words, read out loud by the test examiner.
Both the Afrikaans-culture and Tswana-culture test version
used meaningful words with a higher familiarity for the
Afrikaans and Tswana children, respectively. Examples of
words used in the Afrikaans-culture test version are “com-
puter”, “camera” and “shower”, and examples of the Tswana-
culture test version are “tuckshop” (a small food shop that is
common in the Tswana community), “soccer”, and “braids”.
5.2.2. Attention test
The child's task in the individually administered attention
test was to count the number of times he/she heard a pre-
specified groupofwords in the sequence ofwords readout loud
by the test examiner. The test consisted of 24 items. The
Afrikaans-culture version targeted groups of two electrical
appliances followedbyonepiece of clothing (e.g., Heater–Iron–
Trousers); the Tswana-culture version aimed at groups of two
family members followed by one animal (e.g., Aunt–Son–Dog).
5.2.3. Working memory test
This individually administered test is inspired by the
Working Memory Test Battery for Children (Pickering &
Gathercole, 2001). The first 3 items of our instrument required
the child to judge whether a statement was true or false. The
following 18 items required the child to judge whether a
statement was true or false and remember this while listening
to statements that followed. After the test examiner finished
reading all statements in a single item, the child was asked to
say for each of them whether it was true or false, in the same
order as the examiner read them. The statements increased in
number (from two to seven) aswell as complexity. A statement
of the lowest complexity consisted of one single sentence (e.g.,Please cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus Socce
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (2010), dA fridge is cold); a statementof a higher complexity consisted of
two combined sentences (e.g., A fridge is cold and a kettle cools
water); a statement with the highest complexity contained
three combined sentences (e.g., A fridge is cold and a kettle
cools water and a library has books).
The Afrikaans-culture and Tswana-culture versions con-
sisted of meaningful true/false statements, reflecting familiar
information for the Afrikaans and Tswana children respec-
tively, such as “An alarm can make noise” for the Afrikaans-
culture test version and “A soccer team has 11 players” for the
Tswana-culture test version (soccer is the most popular sport
among the Tswana children whereas rugby is most popular
among the Afrikaans).
5.2.4. Figural fluid reasoning test
This individually administered test is based on the subtest
Situations of the Snijders-Oomen Non-Verbal Intelligence Test,
Revised (Snijders, Tellegen, & Laros, 1989) and relies on the
same principle as Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices
(Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). The child was shown a drawing
with a missing part and had to choose from various answer
options which piece best completed the drawing. The Afri-
kaans-culture and Tswana-culture versions consisted of 18
items and contained drawings of situations (at home, in school,
on the streets) that were highly familiar to the Afrikaans and
Tswana children, respectively. For example, for the Afrikaans-
culture test version, a drawing of a swimming pool was
included, and the Tswana-culture test version contained a
drawingof a specific cookingprocedure (twowomenpreparing
porridge in a three-legged pot). The first seven items had one
missing part, the next seven items had two, and the last four
items had three missing parts.
5.2.5. Verbal fluid reasoning test
This collectively administered test consisted of 19 items.
The child had to choose one word that did not go together
with the other three (for the first 16 items) or the other two
(for the last 3 items). Both the Afrikaans-culture (e.g., rugby–
swimming–cricket–tennis) and Tswana-culture version (e.g.,
grass–fire–three-legged pot–wooden spoon) contained items
that were presumed to be highly familiar for the Afrikaans
and Tswana children, respectively. The test examiner read the
words out loud and the children could read along and circle
their answer on an answer sheet.
5.2.6. Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices
The test (Raven et al., 1998) measures figural fluid
reasoning and requires the child to complete a (meaningless)r in South Africa: Content familiarity contributes to cross-
oi:10.1016/j.intell.2010.07.004
Table 4










M SD M SD
Short-term memory 8.36 2.04 8.59 2.03 1.59 .21
Attention 6.21 5.45 8.18 6.27 14.20 .00
Working memory 5.43 2.38 6.21 2.13 14.92 .00
Figural fluid reasoning 19.78 7.11 18.77 5.24 3.26 .07




6 M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxfigural pattern and was collectively administered. The test
was used as a reference point that did not reflect the
Afrikaans-culture or Tswana-culture test version. Parts A, B,
and C (36 items in total) were administered; the first two
items of part A were used as example items.
5.3. Design
The children of each of the three groups (Afrikaans, urban
Tswana, and rural Tswana) were divided into two subgroups;
one for each of the two test versions (i.e., Afrikaans-culture
and Tswana-culture), reflecting a 3×2 between subjects
design (see Table 2). As far as possible, the subgroups were
matched for sex, grade, and general level of school perfor-
mance as estimated by the teachers. Raven's Standard
Progressive Matrices was administered to all children to
check the comparability of the subgroups that were selected
for each of the test versions (see Table 3 for means and
standard deviations). An ANOVA with test version as
independent variable and the score on the Raven as
dependent variable showed that there were no significant
differences, F(1, 499)=0.53, p=.47. When looking at the
performance differences on the Raven within each of the three
groups, we found that both for Afrikaans (F[1, 159]=0.00,
p=1.00) and rural Tswana (F[1, 157]=0.06, p=.81) children,
performance on the Raven did not significantly differ for theTable 6
Means and standard deviations for the cognitive scores standardized for test versio
Group Short-term memory Attention Working m
Ac version Tc version Ac version Tc version Ac version
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
A .17 .78 -.32 .86 .24 1.18 .25 1.05 .65 1.01
UT .16 1.12 .30 1.15 -.16 .78 -.26 .88 -.23 .91
RT -.35 .96 -.02 .84 -.06 .99 .04 1.02 -.37 .75
Ac=Afrikaans-culture, Tc=Tswana-culture, A=Afrikaans, UT=Urban Tswana, RT
able 5
eans and standard deviations for the raw cognitive scores.
Group Short-term memory Attention Working memo
Ac version Tc version Ac version Tc version Ac version T
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M
A 8.71 1.59 7.95 1.75 7.53 6.45 9.75 6.55 6.98 2.41 6
UT 8.69 2.30 9.20 2.34 5.35 4.27 6.58 5.51 4.87 2.17 5
RT 7.66 1.95 8.56 1.71 5.87 5.39 8.40 6.41 4.55 1.79 6
c=Afrikaans-culture, Tc=Tswana-culture, A=Afrikaans, UT=Urban Tswana, RT=
Please cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus Socce
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (2010), dtwo different test versions. For the urban Tswana children
however, the children selected for the Afrikaans-culture test
version performed significantly higher than those selected for
the Tswana-culture test version, F(1, 179)=5.41, pb .05,
partial η2=.03, Cohen's d=.35.
5.4. Perceived familiarity
Perceived familiarity was assessed as a manipulation
check of the content familiarity of both test versions. After
each cognitive test administration, the children answered
two content familiarity questions: 1) Were there any words/
drawings that you did not know well in the task? (reverse
keyed: none, a few, many); 2) How well did you know the
words/drawings that we used in the task? (not at all, a bit,
very well). For each of the two test versions (i.e., Afrikaans-
culture and Tswana-culture), a factor analysis was performed
on these two items for all tests of that particular test version
(explained variances were 34%, 31%, and Cronbach's alpha
values were .76 and .72, respectively). The factor scores were
used as indicator of perceived content familiarity.
5.5. Socioeconomic status
Childrenwere asked six questions as an indication of SES: 1)
“Do you have your own room?” (yes, no); 2) “How many
televisions are there in your house?”; 3) “Is there a microwave
in your house?” (yes, no); 4) Howmany (cell)phones does your
family (i.e., the people the child lives with) have?”; 5) “How
many cars does your family have?”; 6) Do you have (reading)
books at home?” (yes, no). One factor was extracted from these
items (explained variance=41%, Cronbach's alpha=.63) and
the factor scores were used in further analyses.
5.6. Procedure
Eleven Afrikaans-speaking and eleven Setswana-speaking
females were trained to administer the test battery. Seventeenn.
emory Figural fluid reasoning Verbal fluid reasoning
Tc version Ac version Tc version Ac version Tc version
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
.15 .94 .94 .43 .25 .74 .75 .74 .51 .83
-.22 1.09 -.20 1.00 -.21 1.12 -.35 .86 -.37 1.01
.10 .90 -.70 .64 -.02 1.04 -.35 .97 -.10 .93
=Rural Tswana.
ry Figural fluid reasoning Verbal fluid reasoning
c version Ac version Tc version Ac version Tc version
SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
.53 2.01 26.49 3.06 20.09 3.89 13.88 2.15 13.93 2.78
.74 2.33 18.34 7.10 17.67 5.84 10.69 2.48 10.97 3.37
.42 1.92 14.83 4.53 18.68 5.47 10.68 2.79 11.87 3.12
Rural Tswana.
r in South Africa: Content familiarity contributes to cross-
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Table 7
Bivariate correlations of raw cognitive scores for the Afrikaans group.
STM ATT WM FigFR VerbFr Raven
STM – .36⁎⁎ .31⁎⁎ .37⁎⁎ .34⁎⁎ .31⁎⁎
ATT .08 – .20 .26⁎ .38⁎⁎ .22⁎
WM .26⁎ .26⁎ – .21 .25⁎ .31⁎⁎
FigFR -.04 .28⁎ .13 – .26⁎ .31⁎⁎
VerbFR .09 .35⁎⁎ .14 .34⁎⁎ – .43⁎⁎
Raven .07 .36⁎⁎ .25⁎ .31⁎⁎ .32⁎⁎ –
Note. Values for the Afrikaans-culture test version are below the diagonal;
values for the Tswana-culture test version are above the diagonal. Raven's
Standard Progressive Matrices do not have an Afrikaans-culture and Tswana-
culture test version. STM=Short-term memory, ATT=Attention,
WM=Working memory, FigFR=Figural fluid reasoning, VerbFR=Verbal
fluid reasoning, Raven=Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. ⁎ pb .05.
⁎⁎pb .01.
Table 8
Bivariate correlations of raw cognitive scores for the urban Tswana group.
STM ATT WM FigFR VerbFr Raven
STM – .65⁎⁎ .49⁎⁎ .64⁎⁎ .07 .10
ATT .42⁎⁎ – .62⁎⁎ .52⁎⁎ -.11 -.03
WM .50⁎⁎ .49⁎⁎ – 67⁎⁎ -.03 .02
FigFR .52⁎⁎ .57⁎⁎ .57⁎⁎ – -.01 .11
VerbFR .30⁎⁎ .27⁎ .21⁎ .23⁎ – .26⁎
Raven .25⁎ .23⁎ .19 .46⁎⁎ .34⁎⁎ –
Note. Values for the Afrikaans-culture test version are below the diagonal;
values for the Tswana-culture test version are above the diagonal. Raven's
Standard Progressive Matrices do not have an Afrikaans-culture and Tswana-
culture test version. STM=Short-term memory, ATT=Attention,
WM=Working memory, FigFR=Figural fluid reasoning, VerbFR=Verbal
fluid reasoning, Raven=Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. ⁎ pb .05.
⁎⁎ pb .01.
7M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxwere Psychology students, one had obtained her degree in
Social Work, and four had completed high school. Consent for
participation of the children in the studywas obtained through
the school principals. Individual testing took place in rooms
that were made available by the schools and took about one
hour for each child. One test examiner tested four children on
average in a school day. Two tests (Raven's Standard Progres-
sive Matrices and verbal fluid reasoning) were administered
collectively in the classroom in about one hour; administration
took place after all children had undergone individual testing.
6. Results
Results are described in three sections. We first present
preliminary analyses on item bias, score standardization,Table 9
Bivariate correlations of raw cognitive scores for the rural Tswana group.
STM ATT WM
STM – .18 .30⁎⁎
ATT .36⁎⁎ – .40⁎⁎
WM .25⁎ .27⁎ –
FigFR .01 .15 .08
VerbFR .14 .26⁎ .34⁎⁎
Raven .05 .03 .04
Note. Values for the Afrikaans-culture test version are below the diagonal; values f
Progressive Matrices do not have an Afrikaans-culture and Tswana-culture test ver
FigFR=Figural fluid reasoning, VerbFR=Verbal fluid reasoning, Raven=Raven's S
Please cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus Socce
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (2010), dreliability, background variables, and perceived familiarity as
manipulation check of content familiarity. This is followed by
a validation of the cognitive structure that is suggested to
underlie the test battery. Finally, a multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) is presented that tests the effects of
group and test version on the cognitive test scores.
6.1. Preliminary analyses
6.1.1. Item bias
Item bias (differential item functioning) was computed in
a logistic regression procedure in which item scores were
predicted on the basis of score level, SES, group membership
(dummy coded), and the interaction between score level and
group membership. The analyses showed that 56 out of 212
items were significantly biased; however, the effect sizes
were small; more specifically, the average effect size f2 was
.08 (range: .03–.30). The bias seemed to slightly favor the
Afrikaans group; however, given the small effect sizes, we did
not exclude any items from further analyses.
6.1.2. Score standardization
For each of the five cognitive tests, sum scores were
computed for each of the two versions (combining Afrikaans,
urban Tswana, and rural Tswana children). Analyses of these
raw sum scores showed that the multivariate main effect of
version was significant (Wilks' λ=.92, F(5,495)=9.15,
pb .01; see Table 4 for means, standard deviations, and
MANOVA results); significantly higher scores were obtained
for the Tswana-culture version of the attention test (pb .01,
partial η2=.03, Cohen's d=.34) and the working memory
test (pb .01, partial η2=.03, d=.35) than for the Afrikaans-
culture version. To correct for these differences in difficulty
levels, scores were standardized for each test version for all
tests, thereby enabling a direct comparison of scores across
versions. (Tables 5 and 6 show means and standard
deviations for the unstandardized and standardized scores,
respectively. Tables 7–9 display the correlations between the
unstandardized test scores; correlations of these test scores
with raw scores on Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices are
also included.)
6.1.3. Reliability of cognitive tests
Table 10 gives an overview of the internal consistencies for
all tests for each group and test version. Most values were
acceptable to high. The highest values were found for the







or the Tswana-culture test version are above the diagonal. Raven's Standard
sion. STM=Short-term memory, ATT=Attention, WM=Working memory,
tandard Progressive Matrices. ⁎ pb .05. ⁎⁎ pb .01.
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Table 10












Afrikaans-culture .75 .60 .79 .78 .30**
Tswana-culture .74 .62 .81 .67 .32**
Attentiona
Afrikaans-culture .94 .95 .94 .93 .16
Tswana-culture .93 .95 .93 .91 .27**
Working memorya
Afrikaans-culture .78 .79 .78 .57 .33**
Tswana-culture .75 .75 .77 .71 .11
Figural fluid reasoningb
Afrikaans-culture .89 .58 .89 .69 .61**
Tswana-culture .77 .60 .81 .80 .34**
Verbal fluid reasoningb
Afrikaans-culture .61 .38 .46 .58 .18*
Tswana-culture .70 .63 .71 .66 .11
aValues are split-half reliabilities corrected for test length with the
Spearman-Brown formula. bValues are Cronbach's alpha values. cΔ gives
the average effect size of the three comparisons of the differences in alpha
values between the three groups (interpretable as Cohen's d); the asterisks
refer to the significance of Hakstian and Whalen's (1976) M statistic that
tests differences of the alpha values in the three groups. ⁎ pb .05. ⁎⁎ pb .01.
Table 12
Means, standard deviations, and MANOVA for grade.
Test Grade 3 Grade 4 F
(1, 499)
p partial η2 d
M SD M SD
Short-term
memory
-.18 1.01 .18 .96 16.29 .00 .03 .36
Attention -.14 .99 .14 .99 10.50 .00 .02 .29
Working
memory
-.19 .96 .20 1.00 19.92 .00 .04 .40
Figural fluid
reasoning
-.17 1.01 .17 .96 14.44 .00 .03 .34
Verbal fluid
reasoning
-.13 .97 .13 1.01 9.05 .00 .02 .27
8 M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxthis test; the lowest valueswere found for theAfrikaans-culture
test versionof theverbalfluid reasoning test, showing less score
variation. Significances between the reliabilities of the tests for
the three cultural groups (Hakstian &Whalen, 1976) and their
effect sizes (Liu & Weng, 2009) were computed. Seven out of
ten comparisons showed a significant difference. The average
absolute difference between any two coefficients was .10
(range: .01, .31); the average effect size (interpretable as
Cohen's d) was .27 (range: .03 to .92), which points to a small
effect size. It was concluded that although most tests yielded
significant differences, the differences were not consequential.6.1.4. Sex, grade, and socioeconomic status
In aMANOVAwith sex as independent variable and the sum
score of each test (standardized for test version) as dependent
variables,we founda significantmain effect of sexon short-term
memory and verbal fluid reasoning (see Table 11). Girls scored
higher on these tests than boys. A MANOVA with grade as
independent variable showed significantmain effects for all test
scores (see Table 12). The socioeconomic level of the Afrikaans
children was significantly higher than that of both Setswana-Table 11
Means, standard deviations, and MANOVA for sex.
Test Female Male F
(1, 499)
p partial η2 d
M SD M SD
Short-term
memory
.10 1.00 -.09 .99 4.56 .03 .01 .19
Attention .05 1.05 -.05 .94 1.39 .24 .00 .00
Working
memory
.07 1.07 -.07 .93 2.45 .12 .00 .00
Figural fluid
reasoning
-.00 1.08 .00 .92 .00 .98 .00 .00
Verbal fluid
reasoning
1.06 .98 -.10 1.00 5.49 .02 .01 .21
Table 13
Bivariate correlations of standardized cognitive scores, socioeconomic status,
and perceived familiarity.
Test Socioeconomic status Perceived familiarity
Short-term memory .01 .17**
Attention .16** .24**
Working memory .24** .28**
Figural fluid reasoning .32** .40**
Verbal fluid reasoning .35** .29**
⁎⁎ pb .01.
Please cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (20Socce
10), dspeaking groups, F(2, 498)=244.04, pb .01, partial η2=.50
(posthocanalyseswithBonferroni criterion). Cohen'sdwas2.14
for the comparison between the Afrikaans and urban Tswana
group and 2.06 for the Afrikaans and rural Tswana group. SES
correlated significantly with the sum score of each test
(standardized for test version), except for short-term memory
(see Table 13).6.1.5. Manipulation checks
Perceived familiaritywas assessed as amanipulation check
of the content familiarity of both test versions. The goal was to
establish whether the perceived familiarity was higher for the
version of the own group than for the other version and to
establish whether the perceived familiarity of a group's own
test version was higher than the other groups' perceived
familiarity of this same version. For each group, an ANOVA
was performed with test version (two levels: Afrikaans-
culture and Tswana-culture) as independent variable and the
score on the familiarity questions (factor score) as dependent
variable. For the Afrikaans group, the perceived familiarity of
the Afrikaans-culture version was significantly higher than
that of the Tswana-culture version, F(1, 159)=35.89, pb .01,
partial η2=.18, d=.95. For the urban Tswana group, there
were no significant differences in perceived familiarity
between the test versions, F(1, 179)=1.05, p=.31, partial
η2=.01. The rural Tswana group perceived the Tswana test
version as more familiar than the Afrikaans-culture version,
F(1, 157)=9.71, pb .01, partial η2=.06, d=.49.
Subsequently, for each test version, an ANOVA was
performed with group (three levels: Afrikaans, urban Tswana,
and rural Tswana) as independent variable and the score on the
familiarity questions (factor score) as dependent variable.
Familiarity scores of the Afrikaans group were significantly
higher than those of both Setswana-speaking groups on the
Afrikaans-culture test version, F(2, 250)=97.03, pb .01, partialr in South Africa: Content familiarity contributes to cross-
oi:10.1016/j.intell.2010.07.004
Table 14
Means and standard deviations for the standardized cognitive scores after controlling for differences in sex, grade, and SES.
Group Short-term memory Attention Working memory Figural fluid reasoning Verbal fluid reasoning
Ac version Tc version Ac version Tc version Ac version Tc version Ac version Tc version Ac version Tc version
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
A .17 .79 -.33 .87 .07 1.26 .09 1.05 .42 1.04 -.09 .99 .66 .55 -.06 .81 .42 .82 .17 .90
UT .17 1.07 .30 1.16 -.06 .76 -.20 .90 -.10 .93 -.13 1.14 -.02 1.05 -.09 1.19 -.13 .94 -.25 1.08
RT -.35 .94 -.02 .89 .02 .97 .10 1.01 -.27 .72 .20 .96 -.58 .71 .12 1.09 -.19 1.03 .03 1.04
Ac=Afrikaans-culture, Tc=Tswana-culture, A=Afrikaans, UT=Urban Tswana, RT=Rural Tswana.
Table 15
MANOVA on cognitive test scores.
Source F a p partial η2
Between subjects
Group
Short-term memory 8.61 .00 .03
Attention 2.35 .10 .01
Working memory 3.74 .02 .02
Figural fluid reasoning 13.55 .00 .05
Verbal fluid reasoning 11.30 .00 .04
Group x Test version
Short-term memory 7.95 .00 .03
Attention 0.57 .57 .00
Working memory 10.03 .00 .04
Figural fluid reasoning 23.01 .00 .09





Figural fluid reasoning (0.87)
Verbal fluid reasoning (0.95)
Note. The values for Test version are not displayed in this table because scores
were standardized for each test version, leaving no significant main effects.
Values in brackets represent mean square errors.
a df (2, 495).
9M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxη2=.44 (post hoc analyseswith Bonferroni criterion). Cohen's d
was 2.08 for the comparison between the Afrikaans and urban
Tswana group and 1.91 for the Afrikaans and rural Tswana
group. On the Tswana-culture test version, Afrikaans children
scored significantly higher than the urban Tswana group, F(2,
245)=9.00, pb .01, partial η2=.07 (post hoc analyses with
Bonferroni criterion). Cohen's d was .33. There were no
significant differences between the Afrikaans and rural Tswana
group and between the urban Tswana and rural Tswana group.
Even though Afrikaans children reported a relatively high
familiarity on the Tswana-culture test version, the score
differences between the Afrikaans group and the two other
groups were smaller on the Tswana-culture version than on the
Afrikaans-culture version, and the percentage of explained
variance by familiarity was also substantially smaller. The
manipulation checks largely supported the adequacy of famil-
iarity differences of the test versions. Perceived familiarity scores
(factor scores) correlated significantly with the standardized
sum score of each test (see Table 13); as could be expected,
higher familiarity was associated with higher test scores.
6.2. Validity of cognitive structure
Using structural equation modelling (Arbuckle, 2008), the
validity of the suggested cognitive structure (Fig. 1)was tested. In
order for the model to be identifiable, the regression weight of
oneof the indicators of the latentfluid reasoning factorwas set to
the value of one. For the overall sample (N=501), with scores
standardized for test versionand forgroup,we foundanexcellent
fit (χ2[2, N=501]=.48, p=.79, χ2/df=.24, GFI=1.00,
AGFI=1.00, TLI=1.00, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00); parameter
estimates are given in Fig. 1. For both short-term memory and
attention, the relation with fluid reasoning is partially mediated
by theassociationbetweenworkingmemoryandfluid reasoning.
Multigroup analyses testing the invariance of the model across
the test versions showed an excellent fit when all parameters
were identical (χ2[17, N=501]=18.59, p=.35, χ2/df=1.09,
GFI=.99, AGFI=.98, TLI=.99, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.01). Multi-
group analyses testing the invariance of the model across the
three groups showed that only the unconstrained model
(configural invariance) provided an excellent fit (χ2[6,
N=501]=3.81, p=.70, χ2/df=.64, GFI=1.00, AGFI=.98,
TLI=1.00, CFI=1.00, RMSEA=.00). The reason for the lack of
fit of models with more invariance constraints is not clear.
6.3. MANOVA on cognitive test scores
To correct the cognitive test scores for the effects of sex,
grade, and SES, we first performed linear regression analysesPlease cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus Socce
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (2010), dwith these variables as independent variables (with dummy
codes for sex and grade) and the scores on each test
(standardized for test version) as dependent variables, and
saved the standardized residual scores. Table 14 shows the
means and standard deviations of these residual scores. In
separate analyses, not further documented here, we deter-
mined whether group interacted with sex, grade, and SES for
any of the tests. Negligible to small effect sizes were reported.
This suggested that a correction for these variables did not
distort the patterning of the group differences on which the
next analysis focused.
A MANOVA was performed with test version (two levels:
Afrikaans-culture and Tswana-culture) and group (three
levels: Afrikaans, urban Tswana, and rural Tswana) as
independent variables, and the residual scores as dependent
variables (see Table 15). Test version had no significant effect,
due to the standardization of the scores for each test version.
Group showed a significant effect on all test scores except for
attention. Interactions between group and test version were
significant for short-term memory, working memory, and
figural fluid reasoning. They were not significant for attention
and verbal fluid reasoning. Figs. 2–6 show the residual scores
(i.e., mean z scores corrected for differences in sex, grade, and


























Fig. 2. Mean z scores for groups and test versions for short-term memory. Note. Arrows indicate significant differences (post hoc analyses with Bonferroni
criterion). Significant differences between test versions: F(1, 159)=14.50, pb .01 (Afrikaans group) and F(1, 157)=5.09, pb .05 (rural Tswana group). Significant







10 M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxcognitive test in univariate tests. Table 16 provides an
overview of the (dis)confirmation of hypothesis 1 to 3.
According to the first part of hypothesis 1, the Afrikaans
children were supposed to score at least as high as the rural
Tswana children on the Afrikaans-culture test version, with
increasing score differences when going from left to right in
Fig. 1. Figs. 2–6 show that the Afrikaans children scored
significantly higher than the rural Tswana children on the
Afrikaans-culture test version for each of the five tests, except
for the attention test for which no significant differences were
found. This means that hypothesis 1 was confirmed for all
tests of the Afrikaans-culture test version, except for short-
term memory. We observed significant differences for this
test, which went in the expected direction (i.e., superior
performance by Afrikaans children), whereas we expected
relatively small or nonsignificant differences.
The secondpart of hypothesis 1 stated that the rural Tswana
childrenwere expected to score at least as high as theAfrikaans
children on the Tswana-culture test version, with increasing
scoredifferenceswhengoing from left to right in Fig. 1. Figs. 2–6
show, however, that this group did not score significantly
higher than the Afrikaans children on any of the tests of the
Tswana-culture test version. This implies a disconfirmation of
the second part of hypothesis 1 for two tests (workingmemory
and fluid reasoning) for whichwe expected large differences. It










































Fig. 4.Mean z scores for groups and test versions for working memory. Note.
Arrows indicate significant differences (post hoc analyses with Bonferroni
criterion). Significant differences between test versions: F(1, 159)=10.11,
pb .01 (Afrikaans group) and F(1, 157)=12.14, pb .01 (rural Tswana group).
Significant differences between groups: F(2, 250)=12.72, pb .01 (Afrikaans-
culture version).
Please cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (20Socce
10), dHypothesis 2 (SH) stated that one of the groups would score
at least as high as the other groups on both test versions, with
increasing score differences when going from left to right in
Fig. 1. Fig. 2–6 show that, although the Afrikaans group scored
at least as high as the rural Tswana group on the Afrikaans-
culture version, this was not the case for the Tswana-culture
test version. It seems that hypothesis 2 (SH) was not
completely confirmed either.
Because neither CCH nor SH was fully supported, we
decided to perform further analyses. In addition to our earlier
examination of the patterning of group score differences for
each of the two test versions, we addressed the patterning of
scores on the test versions, as found within each of the three
groups. CCH states that test content affects performance on
cognitively (and with that, culturally) more complex tasks,
with more familiar content leading to a higher performance
than less familiar content. Therefore, the Afrikaans and rural
Tswana groups are expected to do better on the version
developed for their own group than on the version that was
not specifically developed for their own group. This means
that Afrikaans children would score at least as high on the


























Fig. 5. Mean z scores for groups and test versions for figural fluid reasoning.
Note. Arrows indicate significant differences (post hoc analyses with
Bonferroni criterion). Significant differences between test versions: F(1,
159)=43.08, pb .01 (Afrikaans group) and F(1, 157)=23.52, pb .01 (rural
Tswana group). Significant differences between groups: F(2, 250)=47.60,
























Fig. 6. Mean z scores for groups and test versions for verbal fluid reasoning.
Note.Arrows indicate significant differences (post hoc analyseswith Bonferroni
criterion). Significant differences between groups: F(2, 250)=10.43, pb .01
(Afrikaans-culture version) and F(2, 245)=3.85, pb .05 (Tswana-culture
version).
11M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxversion; rural Tswana children would score at least as high on
the Tswana-culture version as on the Afrikaans-culture
version. Differences between test versions are supposed to
be smallest for short-term memory and attention, larger for
working memory, and largest for fluid reasoning.
Fig. 2–6 show that Afrikaans children performed signifi-
cantly better on their own test version than on the Tswana test
version for short-term memory, working memory, and figural
fluid reasoning, and performed equally on both versions for
attention and verbal fluid reasoning. These findings were
mostly in line with CCH; the expected score pattern (for
comparison 1 in Table 16)was confirmed for all tests except for
short-term memory (we expected very small differences) and
for verbal fluid reasoning (we expected large differences).
Althoughweexpectedvery small score differencesbetween the
short-term memory versions, we want to stress that the
direction of the differences was in line with CCH; Afrikaans
children obtained higher scores on the Afrikaans-culture
version than on the Tswana-culture version.
The rural Tswana children scored significantly higher on
the Tswana-culture test version than on the Afrikaans-culture
version for short-termmemory, workingmemory, and figural
fluid reasoning. For attention and verbal fluid reasoning,
scores did not significantly differ for the Afrikaans-culture and
Tswana-culture version. These findings were mostly in line
with CCH and confirmed our expectations for all tests (see the
expected score pattern for comparison 2 in Table 16) except
for short-term memory (we expected very small differences)
and for verbalfluid reasoning (we expected large differences).
Although we expected much smaller score differences
between the short-term memory versions, we want to stress
that the direction of the differences was in line with CCH;
Tswana children obtained higher scores on the Tswana-
culture version than on the Afrikaans-culture version.
The score patterns of the urban Tswana children mostly
confirmedour expectations. They scored in betweenAfrikaans
and rural Tswana children on the Afrikaans-culture test
version of all tests (i.e., they did not score significantly higher
than the Afrikaans children and lower than the rural Tswana
children). Urban Tswana children did not score in betweenPlease cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus Socce
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (2010), dAfrikaans and rural Tswana children on the Tswana-culture
test version of short-termmemory and verbal fluid reasoning,
however, for the other tests of the Tswana-culture version,
there were no significant differences between the groups.
Hypothesis 3 was confirmed for all tests except for short-term
memory and verbal fluid reasoning of the Tswana-culture test
version.
The urban Tswana children performed equally well on the
Afrikaans-culture and Tswana-culture test version for all tests
(confirming the expected score pattern for comparison 3 in
Table 16), as could be expected based on their exposure to
aspects of both Afrikaans and Tswana culture.
Tables 17 and 18 give an overview of Cohen's d values of
the score differences between groups and the score differ-
ences between test versions, respectively. Score differences
were expected to increase with cognitive complexity. When
comparing the d values it becomes clear that hardly any score
differences were found for attention and larger differences
were found for working memory and figural fluid reasoning.
Contrary to our expectations, quite large differences were
found for short-termmemory and small differences for verbal
fluid reasoning.
CCH predicts that the cross-cultural score differences are
explained by the cultural complexity of the tests (conceptual-
ized in the present study as the extent to which test content is
more familiar to one of the compared groups). In analysis of
variance terms, CCH predicts that only disordinal interactions
are found between test version and group for the tests with
high cognitive complexity: it depends on the test versionwhich
group scores highest. SH predicts that cross-cultural score
differences can be explained by differences in general cognitive
ability. This implies that, according to SH, only main effects for
group and, possibly, ordinal interactions between test version
and group are expected for the high cognitively complex tests:
one group scores consistently higher than the other(s). In line
with expectations, the largest score differences were found for
the (theoretically) more cognitively complex tasks. Most
significant interactions on these tests were found for the
Afrikaans and rural Tswana group and were disordinal, in line
with CCH and not with SH. Differences between the Afrikaans
and rural Tswana group were largest for the Afrikaans-culturer in South Africa: Content familiarity contributes to cross-
oi:10.1016/j.intell.2010.07.004
Table 16
Level of confirmation of expected score patterns across test versions and groups.









1 Afrikaans-culture Afrikaans≥Rural Tswana noa yes yes yes yes
Tswana-culture Rural Tswana≥Afrikaans yes yes nob nob no
2 Afrikaans-culture One group≥other groups noa yes yes yes yes
Tswana-culture One group≥other groups no yes no no yesc
3 Afrikaans-culture Urban Tswana in between other groups yes yes yes yes yes
Tswana-culture Urban Tswana in between other groups no yes yes yes no
Comparison Group Test version
1 Afrikaans Afrikaans-culture≥Tswana-culture noa yes yes yes nob
2 Rural Tswana-culture≥Afrikaans-culture noa yes yes yes nob
3 Urban Difference between versions smaller
than for other groups
yes yes yes yes yes
Note. Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, and comparison 1, 2, and 3 are correct for short-term memory and attention when score differences are smallest, for working memory
when they are large(r) and for fluid reasoning when they are largest. aScore differences are in the expected direction but were not expected to be significant for
short-term memory. bScore differences were not significant. cOnly for the Afrikaans and urban Tswana group.
12 M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxversion of figural fluid reasoning (F[1, 160]=155.26, pb .01,
partial η2=.49, Cohen's d=1.96). Figural fluid reasoning
showed the largest differences between test versions in both
the Afrikaans group (F[1, 159]=43.08, pb .01, partial η2=.21,
d=1.04) and the rural Tswana group (F[1, 157]=23.52, pb .01,
partial η2=.13, d=-.76). It appears, in summary, that the
confirmation of CCH and disconfirmation of SH is strongest for
the cognitively most complex tests, because the familiarity
effects are largest for these tests.
7. Discussion
Where do cross-cultural differences in cognitive test scores
come from? Spearman's Hypothesis (SH) holds that the
differences are mainly caused by cross-cultural differences in
cognitive abilities; however, we expect them to be dependent
on the cultural rather than cognitive complexity of a test
(Cultural ComplexityHypothesis, CCH). In the current study the
content familiarity of five cognitive tests was manipulated to
examine its effect on test performance. Two test versions were
created, an Afrikaans-culture and a Tswana-culture version.
The tests were administered to groups of (urban) Afrikaans
children, (urban) Tswana children from the same area as the
Afrikaans children, and (rural) Tswana children from an area
that is relatively isolated from Afrikaans culture. We found an
excellent fit of our hypothesized cognitive structure whenTable 17





A - RT A - UT UT - RT A - RT A - UT UT - RT
Short-term
memory
.59 -.00 .51 -.35 -.61 .30
Attention .05 .13 -.09 -.01 .30 -.31
Working memory .77 .53 .20 -.29 .04 -.32
Figural fluid
reasoning
1.96 .81 .62 -.18 .03 -.18
Verbal fluid
reasoning
.65 .62 .06 .14 .42 -.26
A=Afrikaans, RT=Rural Tswana, UT=Urban Tswana.
Table 18







Short-term memory .60 -.11 -.36
Attention -.02 .17 -.09
Working memory .50 .03 -.55
Figural fluid reasoning 1.04 .06 -.76
Verbal fluid reasoning .28 .11 -.22
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10), danalyzing the sample as a whole. The relation of both short-
term memory and attention with fluid reasoning was partially
mediated by working memory. Only configural invariance
could be established in a comparison of the factor structure for
the three groups (Afrikaans, urban Tswana, and rural Tswana).
Afrikaans children generally scored higher on the Afrikaans-
culture version than the Tswana children. Tswana children
however, did not significantly score higher than the Afrikaans
childrenon the Tswana-culture test version.Nevertheless,most
performance differences between the groups were smaller on
this version than on the Afrikaans-culture version. Afrikaans
and rural Tswana children generally performed better on the
test version that was designed for their own group than on the
other test version. The urban Tswana group did not score
differently on the Afrikaans-culture and Tswana-culture test
version, showing that these children have enough knowledge
of both cultures to perform equally on both versions. We can
conclude that our results support the idea that (after correcting
for confounding differences in SES) the content familiarity of
tests was an important moderator of cross-cultural differences
in test scores in that children generally performed better on the
test version that was designed for their own group than on
another test version.
The short-termmemory test appeared to bemore sensitive
for group differences than expected on the basis of the test's
low cognitive complexity. Urban Tswana children scored
highest on both versions of this test.We could not capture any
educational characteristics to explain these findings (such as
specific training of memory abilities or a stronger reliance on
rote learning in the urban Tswana group as compared to ther in South Africa: Content familiarity contributes to cross-
oi:10.1016/j.intell.2010.07.004
13M. Malda et al. / Intelligence xxx (2010) xxx–xxxother groups). Overall, the largest score differences were
found between the Afrikaans and the rural Tswana groups for
the working memory and figural fluid reasoning tests. These
tests are seen as cognitively more complex than the attention
and short-term memory tests. SH would predict that on two
test versions with a comparable level of cognitive complexity,
regardless of content, score differences between groups are in
the same direction (i.e., interactions between test version and
group are ordinal). However, on closer examination, there
were significant score differences on the Afrikaans-culture
version and no significant differences on the Tswana-culture
version (interactions were disordinal). One could argue that
the difficulty level of the Tswana version was lower than that
of the Afrikaans-culture version; however, this was only the
case for the working memory test. More importantly,
regardless of the level of difficulty, the Afrikaans children
performed significantly lower on the Tswana-culture version
than on the Afrikaans-culture version. Therefore, we conclude
that our findings are not in line with SH, and that (after
correcting for confounding differences in SES) it is cultural
rather than cognitive complexity that explains more differ-
ences between groups, providing support for CCH.
Our studyfits in a series of studies that have given arguments
to question the validity of SH. The first type of argument focuses
on the statistical analyses applied to test SH that are said to be
too lenient (see Dolan et al., 2004). The second type of argument
concerns the confounding of cognitive complexity with cultural
complexity in current tests of SH. A high loading on a general
cognitive ability factor does not merely imply a high cognitive
complexity, but usually goes together with a high cultural
complexity. Confirmations of SH that have been reported in the
literature (e.g., Hartmann et al., 2007; Lynn & Owen, 1994; Te
Nijenhuis & Van der Flier, 1997) may be based on this
confounding in the data. We confirmed findings by Helms-
Lorenz et al. (2003) which indicated that SH can only be tested
when cultural complexity and cognitive complexity are both
varied independently. Data from the present study and from
Helms-Lorenz et al. show that when these types of complexity
are unconfounded, SH is not supported.
In addition to experimentally manipulating the content
familiarity of the tests by creating two versions, familiarity
questions were used to check the perceived familiarity of both
versions. The content familiarityquestions served their purpose
of a manipulation check relatively well; yet their validity could
be challenged. First, social desirability could have played a role
in that children indicated to know certain words or drawings
because they believed they were expected to know these.
Second, children may not have good insight in their familiarity
with stimuli as compared to tasks. Some children found it
difficult to independently evaluate the complexity of stimuli
(words and drawings) and of the task (what had to be done
with the stimuli). Content familiarity appeared very difficult to
measure. Rather thanmerely relying on self-report, it would be
an idea to include a more objective measure of content
familiarity. A test exposing children to various types of test
content andmeasuring their reaction time inmanipulating this
content might circumvent the validity issues.
This study has three limitations. First, the between-
subjects design limits the direct comparability of the two
test versions. Second, the results show that the Afrikaans-
culture and Tswana-culture versions of the verbal fluidPlease cite this article as: Malda, M., et al., Rugby versus Socce
cultural differences in cognitive test scores, Intelligence (2010), dreasoning test were not culturally loaded to the extent that
they could show differences between the groups. It was
difficult to construct items that tap cultural complexity to the
same degree and show substantial variation in difficulty; this
lack of coherence could have resulted in the low internal
consistencies. Third, for each of the four cognitive abilities
reflected in our test battery, only one test was used (except
for fluid reasoning, for which two tests were used). To find
more unequivocal support for the cognitive structure under-
lying the tests (as displayed in Fig. 1), probably more tests
would need to be included. A more extensive battery of tests
would enable stronger conclusions on the validity of SH.
Our study has some practical implications that should be
taken into account in cross-cultural assessment in general,
but more specifically in assessment in multicultural societies
where it is common to derive (cognitive) tests from the
cultural background of a single group, usually the majority
group. Unfamiliar test content can have a significant negative
effect on a child's test performance, possibly providing an
inaccurate estimation (underestimation) of the child's ability.
Therefore, test selection should be based on the appropriate-
ness of content whenever possible. The content familiarity of
a cognitive test should be taken into account in evaluations of
a child's performance and in cross-cultural comparisons of
scores.
The present study also has a theoretical implication.
Cognitive abilities are domain dependent (i.e., their expression
is dependent on aspects such as the type of cognitive task and
the familiarity of its stimuli), notably themore complex abilities;
however, SH does not consider domain features as relevant in
the explanation of cross-cultural differences in cognitive test
scores. Neo-Piagetian psychology (e.g., Demetriou, Shayer, &
Efklides, 1992) and cognitive psychology (e.g., Keane & Eysenck,
2005) include domain features in their models. Cognitive
models that accommodate cross-cultural differences in abilities
should also incorporate these features (such as stimulus
familiarity). Models of cross-cultural differences in cognitive
functioning can only be comprehensive when they address the
domain dependence of these differences.References
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